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SOLIMAN v. COMMISSIONER: THE LATEST WORD ON THE 
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION 
Robin A. Clark 
D emands of the business world, more often than not, require that professionals take their work home with them, both in the evenings and on the weekends. 
Additionally, many self-employed individuals, salespersons, 
artisans, and musicians find it necessary, convenient, and 
economically efficient to work out of their homes. It is not 
uncommon for these groups of professionals to set aside 
·rooms in their houses, apartments, or condominiums as 
"home offices." Some use their home offices just on 
occasion to mill through piled-up paperwork or to make 
telephone calls. Others, however, conduct their business 
affairs regularly and exclusively from their home offices. 
As exhibited in § 262 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(hereinafter "the Code"), Congress has long been reluctant 
to allow deductions for expenses incurred for personal, 
living, and family purposes.1 Under § 162(a), however, 
Congress has consistently allowed deductions for "ordinary 
and necessary" expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in 
carrying on a trade or business.2 Where the personal and 
business spheres merge, such as in the case of the home 
office, legislative and judicial reconciliation of these compet-
ing Code provisions, §§ 262 and I 62(a), pave a treacherous, 
yet well-traveled, road.3 
Section 280A,4 enacted through the Tax Reform Act of 
1976,5 sets forth the extent to which a taxpayer is allowed to 
take a deduction from gross income for expenses incurred for 
a home office. 
Under the current law, a taxpayer who qualifies for the 
home office deduction may deduct a prorated portion of 
certain expenses, e.g., real estate taxes, deductible mortgage 
interest, utilities and services, casualty losses, rent, insur-
ance, depreciation, security systems, painting, and repairs.6 
To calculate the deduction, a qualifying taxpayer must take 
the portion of the home used as the "home office" as a 
percentage of the total square footage ofhis home and use this 
percentage to calculate the prorated portion of expenses 
deductible under the home office statute.7 The amount of the 
deduction, however, is limited to the excess of the gross 
income derived from the home office activity over the sum of 
those expenses incurred without regard to the business use of 
the home and all other expenses attributable to the business 
activity but not attributable to the home business.8 
Congress intended § 280A to provide "defmitive rules to 
resolve the conflict that exist[ ed] between several recent 
court decisions and the position of the Internal Revenue 
Service as to the correct standard governing the deductibility 
of expenses attributable to the maintenance of an office in the 
taxpayer's personal residence. ''9 Prior to the enactment of § 
280A in 1976, little guidance existed for determining the 
appropriateness of a home office deduction. Although § 262 
generally disallows deductions for personal, living, and 
family expenses,IO the only express statutory restriction on 
the deduction is set forth in § 162(a). That provision simply 
requires that expenses be "ordinary and necessary" in 
carrying on the taxpayer's trade or business to qualify for the 
deduction. I I 
The IRS has attempted to offer some guidance to taxpay-
ers and the courts through the promulgation of Treasury 
Regulation § 1.262-1(b)(3) in 1960. In its currentapplica-
tion, that regulation states in pertinent part: 
If ... [the taxpayer] uses part of the house as his 
place of business, such portion of the rent and other 
similar expenses as is properly attributable to such 
place of business is deductible as a business ex-
pense. 12 
Under this regulation, in order for a taxpayer to take the 
deduction for the expenses incurred in the business use of a 
personal residence, the taxpayer must first establish that 
such expenses were incurred in carrying on a business or 
trade pursuant to the requirement of § 162(a).13 Thus, it 
requires a "relatively reasonable connection" between the 
activity conducted in the home and the taxpayer's trade or 
business. 14 If successful, "the allocable portion of the 
expenses attributable to the use of the home as a place of 
business [is] allowed as a deduction" to the extent the 
expenses were "ordinary and necessary" in carrying on the 
taxpayer's trade or business. 15 Priorto 1976, the home office 
deduction was taken largely by self-employed individuals, 
investors, and other employees who maintained home offices 
in connection with their duties as employees. 16 
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service were faced 
with the task of developing standards and limitations for the 
allowance of the home office deduction in light of § 262, § 
162(a), and Treasury Regulation § 1.262-1 (b)(3). As a 
result, competing views regarding the limitations of the 
deduction developed. The Internal Revenue Service took the 
position that expenses incurred in relation to an employee's 
home office were deductible only when that office was 
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required by the employer as a condition of employment and 
was regularly used for the performance of the employee's 
duties.17 Certain courts advocated a more liberal stance and 
held that expenses were "necessary" within the allowance 
provision of § 162(a) when "appropriate and helpful" to the 
employee's business. 18 
With the liberal disposition of the courts, the more 
stringent stance of the IRS, and the basic need to increase 
revenue, Congress responded with the Tax Reform Act of 
1976.19 In adopting this Act, Congress soughtto achieve four 
goals: (1) tax reform improving the equity of the income tax 
at all income levels, (2) tax simplification, (3) continued tax 
reductions, and (4) overall improvement of the administra-
tion of the tax laws.20 Within the goal of tax reform, 
Congress intended to restrict, to some extent, business-
related individual income tax provisions vis-a-vis a limita-
tion on deductions for use of the home.21 
Through the enactment of § 601 of the Tax Reform Act, 
Congress added § 280A to the Code. The IRS advocated the 
restriction that a home office must be main-
incurred in connection with the performance of services 
which are attributable to the business use of the residence 
"only if, in addition to satisfying the exclusive use and 
regular basis tests, the use is for the convenience of his 
employer. If the use is merely appropriate and helpful, no 
deduction attributable to such use will be allowable. "27 
The Senate concurred as to these first two exceptions and 
the incorporation of the distinction between employees and 
non-employees.28 The conference agreement followed the 
definitive rules of the House Bill "but include[d] the excep-
tion under the Senate amendment for a separate structure 
exclusively used on a regular basis in connection with the 
taxpayer's trade or business.''29 
As enacted, the statute clearly sets forth the threshold 
qualifying requirements for the deduction, "exclusivity"30 
and "on a regular basis. "31 Once these initial requirements 
are met, the taxpayer's home office must fall within one of 
the three enumerated statutory exceptions: (1) the home 
office is the principal place of business for any trade or 
business of the taxpayer (the "principal 
tained for the convenience of the employer in 
order for an employee to take the deduction. 
Congress recognized this restriction and 
adopted it in the Act. 22 This was in large part 
a response to the more liberal "appropriate 
and helpful" standard employed by the courts. 
Through § 280A, Congress expressly rejected 
the judicially-created "appropriate and help-
ful" standard.23 Such a liberal and subjective 
standard presented the taxpayer with the op-
portunity to convert otherwise nondeductible 
personal expenses into deductible business 
expenses as a result of the business use of his 
home even though the taxpayer incurred no 
additional expense.24 
Under the current 
law, a taxpayer 
who qualifies for 
the home office 
deduction 
may deduct a 
prorated portion 
of certain 
place of business" exception), (2) the 
home office is the place of business which 
is used by patients, clients, or customers in 
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the 
normal course of business (the "meeting 
with clients" exception), or (3) the home 
office is a separate structure which is not 
attached to the dwelling unit but is used in 
connection with the taxpayer's trade or 
business (the "separate structure" excep-
tion).32 Employees must also use the home 
office for the convenience of the employer. 33 
"Convenience of the employer" is inter-
preted as meaning a condition of employ-
ment, regularly used for the performance 
of the employee's duties, and not just 
expenses . .. 
In order to provide definitive rules, ease the 
administration of the deduction, and prevent the conversion 
of personal expenses into business expenses, Congress, 
through § 280A, promulgated the general rule that no 
deduction would be allowed for the business use of a personal 
residence "unless specifically excepted from this new sec-
tion and otherwise allowable. ''25 The House Bill proposing 
the legislation drew an express distinction between taxpayers 
who are employees and those who are not. For a taxpayer 
other than an employee, an allocable portion of ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in 
connection with trade or business use of the taxpayer's 
dwelling is allowed as a deduction ifused exclusively and on 
a regular basis as the taxpayer's (1) principal place of 
business or 2) place of business used to meet or deal with 
patients, clients, or customers in the normal course of his 
trade or business.26 
Employees, on the other hand, are entitled to deduct only 
that portion of ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
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ordinary and helpful in performing the duties as an em-
ployee.34 
Since the enactment of § 280A in 1976, the Tax Court 
and the federal courts of appeal have adjudicated numerous 
disputes between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice involving the principal place of business exception.3s 
Beyond the statutory language, Congress failed to provide 
any further guidance regarding the scope of this exception.36 
Thus, the courts were left with the dubious responsibility of 
filling the void. Unfortunately for the taXpayers, the courts 
formulated their interpretations purely on guesswork. 
In Baie v. Commissioner,37 the Tax Court, noting the 
lack of legislative guidance as to the scope of "principal 
place of business" in the context of § 280A, arbitrarily 
concluded that "what Congress had in mind was the focal 
pOint of a taxpayer's activities ... .''38 As a general 
proposition, the "focal point" is the place where goods or 
services are provided to customers or clients or where 
income is generated. '>39 
In Baie, the taxpayer operated a street side hot dog stand. 
She prepared the majority of the food at home in her kitchen 
and maintained business records in a spare bedroom. The 
Tax Court disallowed the claimed deduction for expenses 
incurred at home, concluding that the hot dog stand itselfwas 
the "focal point" of the taxpayer's activities, i.e. the place 
where her income was generated.40 
After Baie the Tax Court consistently implemented the 
"focal point" test in determining whether a home office 
constituted the principal place of business. However, on 
appellate review, the federal courts of appeals continually 
questioned the application of the test and on several occa-
sions reversed the Tax Court's decisions.41 
In Drucker v. Commissioner,42 the Tax Court held that 
the taxpayer, a violinist employed by the New York Metro-
politan Opera (the "Met"), had his principal place of bus i-
ness or "focal point" of his business activities at the perfor-
mance hall and not his home studio where he 
practiced thirty to thirty-two hours a week.43 
The Tax Court concluded that the number of 
that indeed this was a rare case where an employee's princi-
pal place of business was different from his employer's.49 
It was such a rare case, indeed, that two years later the 
Second Circuit reached the same conclusion. In Weissman 
v. Commissioner, so the Tax Court disallowed a horne office 
deduction claimed by a university professor. The taxpayer 
argued that his horne office which was used exclusively for 
research and writing purposes, duties required of him as a 
professor, was maintained for the convenience of the em-
ployer.51 The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer's 
principal place of business was the university and reasoned 
that the focal point of any educator's business is generally the 
educational institution. 52 The fact that research and writing 
was an important part of the taxpayer's duties as a professor 
did not operate to shift the focal point to the horne. 53 Unlike 
the Second Circuit's decision in Drucker, the Weissman 
Court stated that this is not a situation where an employee's 
principal place of business would be different from his 
employer's.54 
the 
hours worked at the various locations is a 
consideration, but it is not the controlling 
factor. Other factors include the nature of the 
taxpayer's business, the various activities of 
which it constituted, and the locations where 
those activities were carried OUt.44 In addi-
tion, because the taxpayer was an employee, 
the Tax Court examined these factors from 
the viewpoint of the employer and concluded 
that the focal point of the Met's business was 




within one of 
the three 
The Second Circuit reversed, focusing on 
its holding and rationale in Drucker. It stated 
that instances where "a taxpayer's occupa-
. tion involves two very distinct yet related 
activities ... , the focal point approach creates 
a risk of shifting attention to the place where 
the dominant portion of his work is accom-
plished. "55 Therefore, attention should be 
given to ''the nature of [the] business activi-
ties, the attributes of the space in which such 
activities are conducted, and the practical 
necessity of using a home office to carry out 
such activities. "56 
The Second Circuit disagreed and instead 
emphasized ''time'' and "importance" of 
the activities performed at home. Great 
weight was also given to the fact that the 
enumerated 
statutory The commissioner argued that the legisla-
tive history of § 280A reflects a specific intent 
that when such expenses are merely appropri-
exceptions. 
employer did not provide the employee with practice facili-
ties even though the employee was expected to practice 
individually off the premises. Based on these factors, the 
Second Circuit found that the home practice studio was the 
focal point of the taxpayer's employment-related activities, 
and, thus, was the taxpayer's principal place of business 
within § 280A.46 
This holding, the court said, did not frustrate the legisla-
tive intent of § 280A. Although Congress intended to provide 
clearer standards for the deduction and to prevent the conver-
sion of personal expenses into business expenses, the court 
reasoned that Congress did not direct such changes to a 
taxpayer-musician for whom a home practice area was 
essential. 47 Furthermore, because the home practice sessions 
were essential to the employee's business activities as a 
musician and were truly for the convenience of the employer, 
the home studio was not "purely a matter of personal 
convenience, comfort. or economy. "48 The court cautioned 
ate and helpful Congress clearly did not intend 
to allow the deduction of such expenses. 57 In rejecting this 
argument, the Second Circuit stated that the legislative intent 
"merely reflects [a] general concern that the horne office be 
used exclusively for business purposes, [not casually or 
occasionally], and, in the case of an employee, ... for the 
convenience of [the] employer."58 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that because the taxpayer conducted the majority of 
his work at horne, and, more importantly, because the horne 
office was essential to the performance of his employment-
related activities, the practical necessity of the home office 
negated any claim that the office was used as a matter of 
personal convenience. 59 
In Meiers v. Commissioner,6O the taxpayers owned and 
operated a self-service laundromat. They maintained an 
office in a spare bedroom of their residence in which em-
ployee work schedules were drafted and bookkeeping was 
performed.61 The Tax Court found that the facts, holding, 
and rationale of its earlier decision in Baie controlled and, 
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therefore, the focal point of the taxpayers's business was the 
place where income was generated and services rendered, i.e. 
the laundromat. 62 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and again criticized the 
application of the focal point test. The test, the court stated, 
"places undue emphasis upon the location where goods or 
services are provided to customers and income is generated, 
not necessarily where work is predominantly performed. "63 
Although the court conceded that the focal point test was easy 
to apply and relatively objective compared to pre-§ 280A 
standards, those benefits were outweighed by the unfairness 
of the test and its failure to carry out the "apparent intent" 
of Congress. 64 Instead, the court applied other factors, such 
as the length of time the taxpayer spends in his home office, 
the importance of business functions performed there, the 
business necessity of maintaining a home office, and the cost 
of establishing the home office. By using this approach, the 
court soughtto "carry out the purpose of Congress to prevent 
taxpayers from converting non-deductible 
self-employed anesthesiologist, worked at three Washing-
ton, D.C. area hospitals. Because none of the hospitals 
provided him with an office, he maintained an office at his 
home in which he perform~ administrative and organiza-
tional activities. After examining all the facts and circum-
stances, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer the deduction 
which under the old "focal point" test would have been 
denied.76 The court explained: 
A principal place of business is not necessarily 
where goods and services are transferred to clients 
or customers but is frequently the administrative 
headquarters of a business. Furthermore, where no 
other suitable office is provided for essential organi-
zational activities of a business, the fact that goods 
and services are delivered elsewhere should not per 
se require a conclusion that a home office is other 
than the principal place of business. The inquiry is 
appropriately into the surrounding facts and circum-
stances.77 
personal expenses into deductible business 
expenses while ensuring that taxpayers re-
tain their entitlement to deduct necessary 
business expenses. "65 
In response to this criticism, the Tax 
Court took a step back and recognized the 
need to re-examine the "focal point" test. In 
Pomarantz v. Commissioner,66 the Tax 
Court did not attemptto reconcile the federal 
courts of appeals decisions since the case 
could be disposed of under any standard. 67 
In Po marantz, the taxpayer, a physician, 
was a sole proprietor who contracted with an 
area hospital and provided emergency medi-
cal care services thirty-three to thirty-six 
hours a week.68 Under any test, it was clear 
that the taxpayer did not conduct acti vities in 
his home office of "sufficient importance" 
The primary 
factor to 
consider is the 
relative 
The Tax Court's "facts and circum-
stances" test approach was criticized by one 
commentator as distorting the plain meaning 
of the "principal place of business" into 
something more like the "essential place of 
business. "78 In addition, through the failure 
of the Tax Court to set forth a comparative 
analysis of both the time spent at the home 
office and the activities performed there as 
compared with other business locations, the 
Tax Court implied that such other business 
activities were irrelevant. 79 
importance 
of the activities 
conducted 
at each On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the Tax Court's decision and endorsed the 
"facts and circumstances" test. 80 It noted 
the significance of factors such as the essen-
tial nature of the home office to the taxpayer' s 
business 
location . .. 
to render it his principal place ofbusiness.69 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision and 
endorsed its rationale.70 The court pointed out that the 
taxpayer consistently spent more time at the hospital since 
the essence of his profession was the "hands-on" treatment 
of patients at the hospital and his income was generated at the 
hospital.7) 
In Soliman v. Commissioner,72 the Tax Court "revis-
ited" the focal point test and its own interpretation of § 280A 
in light of the federal courts of appeals decisions "for cases 
in which administration of the taxpayer's business is essen-
tial and the only available office space is the taxpayer's 
home. "73 It concluded that, in essence, the focal point test 
merges the principal place of business exception with the 
meeting of clients exception.74 
In order to resuscitate the exception, the Tax Court 
adopted the "facts and circumstances" test.75 Soliman, a 
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business, the amount of time the taxpayer 
spends there, and the availability of another 
location available for the performance of the office functions 
of the business.8) The court rejected the commissioner's 
argument that this new test renders § 280A meaningless by 
creating a new loophole for every taxpayer who works at 
home.82 The court supported its position on the ground that 
the Tax Court justifiably relied on Proposed Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.280A-2(b)(3).83 Although it recognized that the 
regulation is not binding on the Tax Court or itself, the Fourth 
Circuit found that the proposed regulation represents the 
"spirit" of § 280A by allowing deductions for legitimate 
home offices.84 The court concluded that the facts and 
circumstances test merely "replaces the inflexible and poten-
tially unjust 'focal point' test . . . [and] more accurately 
reflects the purposes and requirement of § 280A .... ''85 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.86 In 
Commissionerv. Soliman,87 the Court expressly rejected the 
Fourth Circuit's facts and circumstances test because it 
failed to undertake a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's 
various business locations.88 The Court reached this conclu-
sion relying solely on the "ordinary, everyday sense" of the 
word "principal" as itis used in § 280A(c)(l)(A).89 Because 
the dictionary meaning of "principal" is "most important, 
consequential, or influential," it, therefore, "suggests that 
a comparison of locations must be undertaken. '>90 The 
Supreme Court made only a brief reference to the legislative 
history of § 280A . It referred only to the "apparent purpose 
of § 280A, which is to provide a narrower scope for the 
deduction .... ''91 
Justice Kennedy, the author of the Soliman opinion, set 
forth a dual standard comparative analysis for determining 
whether a home office is the principal place of business of the 
taxpayer. The primary factor to consider is the relative 
importance of the activities conducted at each business 
location, taking into account the nature of the taxpayer's 
business and those tasks which generate 
different result as a matter of tax policy, then Congress 
should change the language of the statuteYXl 
Justices Thomas and Scalia, although concurring in the 
result, cautioned that the Soliman comparison test is too 
subjective and would be difficultto apply. They endorsed the 
focal point test because it provides a clear and reliable 
method for determining the principal place of business of the 
taxpayer.IOI 
Commissioner v. Soliman is the final word on the home 
office deduction. The complexity and subjectiveness of the 
comparative analysis test set forth in Soliman, however, 
frustrates the intent of Congress to provide "definitive rules" 
governing the standards for taking a home office deduc-
tion. I02 Justice Stevens, author of the only dissenting opin-
ion, believed that, based on a comparison of the Soliman 
opinion and the legislative goals of the statute, the majority 
misread the statute and deviated from the congressional 
purpose of § 280A I03 
Congress sought to increase the objectiv-
income. Furthermore, in determining the 
place where the most important functions 
are performed, great weight is given to the 
point of delivery of goods and services. 92 If 
no business location is deemed "principal" 
under the initial inquiry, then the second 
factor, the time spent at each business loca-
tion, "assumes particular significance. ''93 
The fact that the taxpayer has no alternative 
office space or that the activities performed 
afthe home office are essential is irrelevant 
to the inquiry. 94 
· .. the Court 
failed to give 
the principal 
place of business 
ity and ease of administration of the home 
office deduction with the enactment of § 
280AI04 The two prong test set forth in 
Soliman, however, requires a unique factual 
determination ona case-by-case basis. Such 
a test is too subjective and creates uncer-
tainty as to how to apply and weigh these 
factors. For example, it is unclear how the 
Court would have held if Dr. Soliman had 
spent only ten to fifteen hours a week at the 
three hospitals but thirty to thirty-five hours 
a week in his home office. lOS Justice Thomas 
pointed out in his concurrence, "[the Su-
preme Court] granted certiorari to clarify a 
recurring question of tax law that has been 
The comparative analysis only answers 
the question whether the home office quali-
fies as the principal place of business of the 





is the principal place of business.9s Therefore, the Court 
cautioned the courts and the commissioner not to strain to 
conclude that a home office qualifies simply because no other 
location does, for "[t]he taxpayer's house does not become 
a principal place of business by default. ''96 
Applying these principles to the facts of Soliman, the 
Court determined that the home office activities of the doctor 
were "less importantto the business of the taxpayer than the 
tasks he performed at the hospital. ''97 Furthermore, because 
the doctor spent only ten to fifteen hours a week at the home 
office as compared to the thirty to thirty-five hours a week he 
spent at the three hospitals, the time spent at home was not 
significant enough to render the home office his principal 
place of business.98 Therefore, in light of all the circum-
stances, the taxpayer's home office did not qualify as the 
principal place of business for purposes of the deduction.99 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed that 
the language of the statute requires the comparative analysis 
enunciated by Justice Kennedy. If Congress intended a 
the subject of considerable disagreement. 
Unfortunately, the issue is no clearer today than it was before 
[the Court] granted certiorari."I06 
In addition, the Court failed to give the "principal place 
of business" exception any independent significance. By 
placing "great weight" on the "point of delivery of goods 
and services," the Court created the "focal point" dilemma 
recognized by the Tax Court in its Soliman decision. lo7 
Furthermore, the home office can be considered the principal 
place of business only when those goods and services are 
rendered at the home office, thus merging once again the 
meeting clients exception and the principal place of business 
exception. This surely is contrary to the intent of Congress 
to give the "principal place of business" exception indepen-
dent significance by enacting not two but three exceptions. 
Most importantly, Soliman is just bad tax policy. The 
decision creates the danger of treating similarly situated 
taxpayers differently. For example, assume Taxpayer A and 
Taxpayer B are self-employed anesthesiologists who con-
tract their services out to area hospitals. Taxpayer A builds 
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a small one-room structure in his large, suburban backyard. 
Taxpayer B lives in a three room condominium in the city. 
None of the hospitals provides offices for the taxpayers. 
Each spends approximately thirty hours a week at the 
hospitals and fifteen hours a week at his home offices taking 
care of the administration of his business. Taxpayer A takes 
the home office deduction falling neatly within the separate 
structure exception pursuant to § 280A(c){l)(B). Taxpayer 
B, on the other hand, does not take the deduction because of 
the Soliman decision. I08 
The inherent fallacy of Soliman is evident. In assessing 
the availability of the deduction, it is illogical to analyze the 
activities which the taxpayer performs at home in relation to 
activities performed elsewhere. The taxpayer who can 
construct a separate structure gets the deduction ipso facto 
regardless of the activities performed in the structure. The 
Soliman test thus creates an inequity. 
As evidenced by the legislative history of § 280A, Con-
gress clearly intended to curb the abuse of the "appropriate 
and helpful" standard by employees. However, Congress 
did not intend to unfairly deny a benefit to the self-employed, 
which Soliman operates to do. I09 Furthermore, the facts of 
Soliman dealt with a self-employed taxpayer for whom no 
alternative office space existed at the three other business 
locations and for whom the home office was essential. 
Surely, Congress did not intend the statute to compel the self-
employed to rent office space. Instead, a self-employed 
person's efficient use of his resources should be encouraged 
by tax policy.I1O Justice Stevens concluded that a self-
employed taxpayer should qualify for the deduction when his 
home office is ''the only place of his trade or business. "111 
In response to the subjective comparison set forth in 
Soliman, two commentators suggest careful planning in 
order to qualify prospectively for the deduction.1I2 A tax-
payer can simply locate his office outside the home and avoid 
the ugly Soliman comparison altogether or use a separate 
structure on his residential property for his home office, 
thereby falling into the separate structure exception. 113 These 
suggestions, however, are financially impractical for those 
taxpayers who are trying to decrease overhead expenses by 
locating their offices in their homes. 114 The best strategy, the 
commentators suggest, is for the taxpayer to design his 
business to allow the taxpayer to meet patients, clients, and 
customers at the taxpayer's home. In that way, the taxpayer 
fits neatly into the meeting with clients exception and, again, 
avoids Soliman altogether. 115 
As a result of the Supreme Court decision in Soliman, it 
is unclear whether the principal place of business debate will 
continue. It is clear, however, that Congress is responsible 
for any further clarification or definition. 
The change mandated by Soliman is simple. The legisla-
tive history provides the necessary objective standards in 
determining the allowance of a home office deduction. All 
taxpayers, employees and non-employees, engage in the 
8 - U. Bait. L.F. I 24.1 
threshold inquiry. The first question is whether the use of the 
home office is exclusive. If so, then the issue is whether the 
home office is used on a regular basis. If the answer to the 
second question is also yes, then the distinction between 
employees and non-employees becomes relevant. 
In the case of a taxpayer who is an employee, the only 
remaining inquiry is whether the use of the portion of the 
dwelling as a home office is for the convenience of the 
employer. As long as the office is for the convenience of the 
employer and not merely for personal convenience of the 
employee, the deduction is allowable to the extent that the 
expenses are ordinary and necessary in carrying on the 
taxpayer's trade or business. 
A taxpayer who is not an employee, i.e., an employer or 
a self-employed person, must demonstrate that his home 
office fits into one of the three specific exceptions. If the 
taxpayer uses his home office to meet patients, clients, or 
customers in the normal course of his trade or business, the 
deduction is allowable. If the taxpayer has a separate 
,structure used in the connection with his trade or business, 
the deduction is allowed. Neither of these exceptions re-
quires further analysis. 
Finally, if this taxpayer does not fit into one of these two 
exceptions, it is necessary to apply the principal place of 
business exception. This is an arguably broader, if not 
residual, exception intended to protect those taxpayers who 
are self-employed and deserving of the benefit of the deduc-
tion but for whom it would be impractical to go to the expense 
of constructing a separate structure. It also aids those 
taxpayers whose business or trade does not involve meeting 
clients at their home. Clearly, Congress intended to preserve 
the home office deduction for this group of taxpayers through 
the principal place of business exception. 
This result does not create the danger of excessive 
deductions. The exclusivity and regular basis tests narrow 
the availability of the deduction, and the expenses are still 
limited to those that are ordinary and necessary. The 
requirements of "exclusivity" and "regular basis" ensure 
that the taxpayer spends a sufficient amount of time in his 
home office. Further, to ensure the legitimacy of these home 
offices which are claimed to be "principal," Congress could 
further restrict the ability of the taxpayer to treat his home 
office as his principal place of business by requiring, as 
Justice Stevens suggested, that it be the only place of his trade 
or business. The only true alternative office space to a 
taxpayer in this position is that which the taxpayer would 
have to undertake and individually lease. In this way, the 
statute would never operate to compel a taxpayer to lease 
office space merely to take a deduction of ordinary and 
necessary business expenses, thereby promoting sound tax 
policy by encouraging efficient use of the taxpayers's re-
sources. 
In an effort to substantially improve the fairness of the tax 
system, Congress enacted § 280A as the objective and 
definitive standard for the allowance of the home office 
deduction. In doing so, Congress sought to curb excessive 
claims by employees who found it personally convenient to 
take work home. Congress did not intend to deny the benefit 
which existed prior to 1976 for those self-employed taxpay-
ers. 
The recent interpretation by the Supreme Court of the 
principal place of business exception clearly frustrates the 
intent of Congress by setting forth a complex and subjective 
standard which has the potential to deny tax equity to 
similarly situated taxpayers rather than a definitive and 
objective standard. The only remedy to this judicial malady 
is legislative action. Until any such action takes place, 
taxpayers must either creatively design their home offices to 
comply with the statute in light of the Soliman decision or 
take steps to avoid the statute altogether. 
About the author: 
Robin A. Clark is entering her third year at the University of 
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Endnotes: 
·See I.R.C. § 262 (1986). Compare I.R.C. § 24 (a)(1) (1939). The 
statute states as follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or 
family expenses." I.R.C. § 262. Deductions are a matter of 
legislative grace and it is within the power of Congress to grant 
or deny them. Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner, 
630 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). (Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references are to the Code as amended in 1986). 
2See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986). Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (1954). 
The statute provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred by the 
taxpayer during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business .... " I.R.C. § 162(a). This section was primarily 
intended to allow recovery for recurring expenditures where the 
benefit derived from the payment is realized and exhausted 
within the same taxable year. Stevens v. Commissioner, 388 
F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968). 
3See Newiv. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686(1969), aff'd, 
432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 
515 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 941 (1979); and Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 
(1973), rev 'd, 509F.2d679 (4thCir.1975),cert. denied,423 U.S. 
825 (1975). 
4I.R.C. § 280A (1986). Section 280A states in pertinent part: 
(a) General Rule - Except as otherwise provided in this 
section in the case of a taxpayer who is an individual or 
an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable 
under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the 
use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer 
during the taxable year as a residence. 
(c) Exceptions for certain business or rental use; 
limitation on deduction for such use.-
(1) Certain business use.- Subsection (a) shall not 
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apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to 
a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used 
on a regular basis-
(A) [as] the principal place ofbusiness for 
any trade or business of the taxpayer, 
(B) as a place of business which is used by 
patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing 
with the taxpayer in the nonnal course of business, or 
(C) in the case of a separate structure 
which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection 
with the taxpayer's trade or business. 
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall 
apply only if the exclusive use referred to is for the 
convenience of his employer.Id. 
sTax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1569 
(1976). 
6U.S. Dep't ofTreas., Pub. No. 587, Business Use of Your Home, 
at 4-5. Landscaping and lawn care costs are expressly non-
deductible expenses. Id. 
71 d. at 3. Also, the IRS suggests that if all the rooms in the home 
are approximately the same size, then a taxpayer can simply 
divide the total expenses by the total number of rooms in order to 
calculate the deductible expenses. Id. 
sId.at5. ThroughtheTaxReformActofl986,Congressclarified 
what it meant by gross income. Gross income equals gross 
revenues derived from the home office business minus the 
"direct" expenses, e.g., secretarial, telephone, copy machine, 
and facsimile expenses. For example, if a taxpayer has derived 
$3,000 in gross revenues from his business in one taxable year and 
has incurred $2,000 in direct expenses, his gross income is $1,000 
and, therefore, his home office deduction is limited to $1,000 for 
that taxable year. This prevents taxpayers from creating a net 
business loss through the implementation of the home office 
deduction. However, the Code does currently allow the taxpayer 
to carry over the disallowed portion of the home office deduction 
to the following taxable year. See Price Waterhouse, The Price 
Waterhouse Guide to the New Tax Law 173-77 (1986). 
9Jf.R Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 160 (1975), 
reprinted in 1975 u.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3053. S. Rep. No. 938, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579. 
1°I.RC. § 262 (1954). See also supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. 
III.RC. § 162(a)(1954). See also supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
12Treas.Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (3) (1992). The regulation states in full: 
Expenses of maintaining a household, including amounts 
paid for rent, water, utilities, domestic service, and the 
like, are not deductible. A taxpayer who rents a property 
for residential purposes, but incidentally conducts busi-
ness there (his place of business being elsewhere) shall 
not deduct any part of the rent. If, however, he uses part 
of the house as his place of business, such portion of the 
rent and other similar expenses as is properly attribut-
able to such place of business is deductible as a business 
expense. Id. 
13H.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
14H.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
ISH.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
16JI.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
l7Rev. Rul. 62-180,1962-2 C.B. 52. 
ISBlackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 255,256 (2d Cir. 1934). 
See also Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 
1970). Although the IRS complained that such a construction 
"would open the doors for a business deduction to any employee 
who would voluntarily choose to engage in an activity at home 
which conceivably could be helpful to his employer's business. 
.. ," the Second Circuit responded, "[t]his case opens the doors 
just long enough to enable this [t]axpayer to pass through it into 
his cloistered study to pursue his business." Newi, 432 F.2d at 
1000. 
19'fhe projected revenue effect of § 601 of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976 was $207 million in 1977, increasing progressively by 1981 
to $305 million in additional tax revenue. Section 601 enacted 
several changes to the Code relating to business-related indi-
vidual income tax deductions, including the home office deduc-
tion, for expenses attributable to homes, rental homes, or vacation 
homes, etc. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 4. 
20Ji.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 3. 
21ld. at 157. 
22H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 157. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 144 (emphasis added). See also I.R.C § 280A. 
23H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
24H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147-148. In support thereof, the House and Senate 
reports accompanying the proposed legislation cite and discuss at 
some length Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev 'd, 
509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975). Bodzin, an attorney-advisor 
employed by the Interpretive Division of the Office of Chief 
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, claimed a business deduction 
for the small office which he maintained in his apartment. 
Although his employer provided him with an office close to home, 
the taxpayer found it convenient to work at home in the evenings 
and on the weekends. The Tax Court held that the statute did not 
require a strict interpretation that the employer require that the 
employee provide his own work facilities. Instead, the Tax Court 
held that the applicable test for determining the appropriateness 
of the deduction in an employee's residence is "whether ... the 
maintenance of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful 
under all circumstances." 60 T.C. at 825 (emphasis 
added)( citations omitted). 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax 
Court decision concluding that the expenses incurred by the 
taxpayer at home were personal expenses which were not deduct-
ible and, therefore, it followed that an inquiry into the "appropri-
ateness" and "helpfulness" of those expenses was not necessary. 
509 F.2d at 681. However, the court suggested that the outcome 
of Bodzin might have been different if the taxpayer-employee 
could have demonstrated that his office provided for him by 
his employer was not available at all times or that his employer's 
office was not suitable in light of the duties required of the 
employee. ld. 
2sH.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra 
note 9, at 147. 
26JI.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160-61. 
27id. at 161. 
28S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148. In addition to the two 
exceptions proposed and later approved by Congress, the Senate 
amendment proposed three other allowable deductions for the 
portion of a dwelling which is used exclusively and on a regular 
basis (a) if the dwelling is the sole fixed location of the taxpayer's 
trade or business of selling goods or services at retail or wholesale 
and is used in connection with the sale of goods or services, (b) 
if a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit 
is used in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, or (c) 
if the employer provides no office or fixed location for the use of 
the employee in the employer's trade or business (in connection 
with such trade or business.) id. Why the Conference Committee 
rejected the first and third exceptions proposed by the Senate is 
unclear. 
29JI.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 435, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4118. 
3O<'Exclusive use" means that a taxpayer must use a specific part 
of his residence solely for the purpose of carrying on his trade or 
business. Therefore, where that portion is used by the taxpayer 
for personal purposes as well, the exclusivity test is not met. H.R. 
Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 
9, at 148 (emphasis added). Two exceptions to the "exclusivity" 
requirement are (1) less than exclusive storage of inventory which 
the taxpayer intends to sell at wholesale or retail and (2) a 
taxpayer who uses the home office as a day care facility. U.S. 
Dep't of Treas., supra note 6, at 3. 
31That portion of the residence must be used by the taxpayer for 
business purposes on a regular basis. Any incidental or occa-
sional business or trade use of an exclusive portion of the dwelling 
unit renders the deduction disallowed. H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra 
note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148-49. 
321.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(A)-(C). See also supra note 5. 
331.R.C. § 280A(c)(I). H. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. 
Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148. 
34Rev. Rul. 62-180, supra note 17. 
35See, e.g., Druckerv. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev 'd, 
715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 
T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); 
and Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (19.84), 
rev'd, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986). 
36Section 280A (c)(I)(A) was amended in 1981. Thisamendment 
substituted the current language of the statute, "the principal 
place ofbusiness for any trade or business of the taxpayer" for "as 
the taxpayer's principal place of business." Pub. L. No. 97-119, 
95 Stat. 1642 (1981). 
3774 T.e. 105 (1973). 
38id. at 109. (emphasis added). After a brief discussion of the 
legislative history of § 280A, the Tax Court posits, "Nothing in 
the legislative history of section 280A or the [c]ommissioner's 
regulations furnishes any guidance as to the scope of the 'princi-
pal place of business' concept in the context of § 280A. We 
therefore take it that what Congress had in mind was the focal 
point of a taxpayer's activities .... " id. Without any support or 
authority, such a conclusion was clearly arbitrary. The focal point 
does, however, provide an objective and workable standard for 
making the determination of whether a home office qualifies as 
the principal place of business. 
39id. See also Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
4°Baie, 74 T.C. at 105-06, 109. 
41See cases cited supra note 35. 
4279 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983). 
4379 T.C. at 609. 
44id. at 612 (citations omitted). 
45Id. at 613-14. Since the Met's business depended upon the 
quality ofits performers, the retention of the taxpayer's job really 
depended upon his performance at the Met rehearsals and public 
performances. !d. at 614. 
46Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67,69. 
47Id. at 69-70. 
48id. at 70 (quoting Sharon v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 515,523 
(1976». 
49id. at 69. 
5°47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984). 
51 47 T.C.M. at 522. Although the professor was provided with 
office space on campus, he was forced to share it with other 
faculty members and no typewriter was provided him. id. 
at 521. 
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71d. at 515. The portion of the House Report which the commis-
sioner used to support his argument provides:
[The] expenses otherwise considered nondeductible per-
sonal, living, and family expenses might be converted
into deductible expenses simply because, under the facts
of the particular case, it was appropriate and helpful to
perform some portion of the taxpayer's business in his
personal residence. For example, ifa university profes-
sor, who is provided an office by his employer, uses a den
or some other room in his residence for the purpose of
grading papers, preparing classroom notes, an allocable
portion of certain expenses might be claimed as a
deduction even though only minor incremental ex-
penses were incurred in order to perform these activities.
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160).
581d. at 515-16.
591d. at 515, 517. The court found great significance in the fact
that the professor had to share his office with a fellow faculty
member, the office did not contain a typewriter, and the university
library had limited hours of operation and was generally unsafe.
Therefore, the home office was essential to the performance of the
duties required of this university professor. Id. at 513.
6049 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984), rev'd, 782 F.2d 78 (7th Cir.
1986).
6149 T.C.M. at 137.
621d. at 138.
63Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 78, 79 (emphasis added)
(citing Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520(1983),
rev 'd, 751 F.2d 512, 514). See supra notes 55-56 and accompa-
nying text.
"Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79.651d. (citations omitted).
6.52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (1986), afrd, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1988).
6752 T.C.M. at 602.
6 ld. at 600.
691d. at 602.
70Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (1988).711d. at 497-98. See also 52 T.C.M. at 602.
7294 T.C. 20 (1990).
731d. at 25.
741d. The court explained: "Goods and services could be trans-
ferredto customers and clients at the taxpayer's home, the 'focal
point,' only if the taxpayer meets clients or customers in his
home." Id.
751d.
761d. Because Soliman rendered the majority of his services at the
three hospitals and those activities generated his income, under
the focal point test his principal place of business would be the
hospitals, not his home office.
771. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
78Kathleen Low, Soliman v. Commissioner: Recent Changes in
the Tax Court's Treatment ofthe Home Office Deduction, 22 Loy.
U. Chi. L. J. 277, 291 (1990).
791d. at 291. In place of the facts and circumstances test, the
commentator proposes an objective two prong test. First, if the
taxpayer spends the majority of time at the home office, then the
taxpayer takes the deduction. If the taxpayer spends less than the
majority of his time at the home office, then the court looks to the
location where the "income generating" tasks are performed. If
they take place at home, then the taxpayer can take the deduction.
If the taxpayer simply performs administrative duties at home
which the commentator does not consider "income generating,"
then the taxpayer's home office would not qualify as a principal
place of business. Id. at 292-95.
6 Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
11d. at 54.
82Id.
11d. at 54-55 (citing Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45
Fed. Reg. 52,399 (as amended in 1983). The regulation states in
pertinent part:
(3) Determination ofprincipal place ofbusiness. When
a taxpayer engages in a single trade or business at more
than one location, it is necessary to determine the
taxpayer's principal place of business in light of all the
facts and circumstances. Among the facts and circum-
stances to be taken into account in making this determi-
nation are the following:
(i) The portion of the total income from the business
which is attributable to activities at each location.
(ii) The amount of time spent in activities related
to that business at each location; and
(iii) The facilities available to the taxpayer at each
location for purposes of that business. Id.
81d. at 54.
"Id. at 55. The only "purpose" to which the Fourth Circuit refers
is the prevention of abuse of the deduction by taxpayers for
expenses which are "appropriate and helpful." Id. at 53-54.
6Commissioner v. Soliman, -- U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992).
10-- U.S. --, 113 S.Ct. 701, 121 L.Ed.2d 634 (1993).
81113 S.Ct. at 703-04.
"Id. at 705-06 (citingMalatv. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569,571 (1966)
(per curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6
(1947))).
9°1d. at 706 (emphasis added).
911d. at 705.
9Id. at 706. Although this is quite reminiscent of the "focal
point" test, the Court cautioned that the "metaphorical quality"
of the phrase can be misleading and that no one test is determi-
native in every case. The Court still regards the point of delivery








°1d. at 709 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' ld. at 709-11 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
'See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24. 1
103 113 S.Ct. at 711 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
104See supra note 9. 
105 113 S.Ct. at 711 (Thomas & Scalia, 11., concurring). 
106Jd. at 710 (Thomas & Scalia, J1., concurring). 
107See supra note 92. See a/so supra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text. 
10BTaxpayer B is advised against taking the deduction because of 
the similarity of this position to that of the taxpayer in Soliman. 
Because his more important activities are perfonned at the 
hospital and he spends less than a substantial amount of time at 
his home office, the deduction, under Soliman, would be denied. 
109113 S.Ct. at 711 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
II°Id. at 715. 
'IIId. 
IIlMichael M. Meggard & Susan L. Meggard, Supreme Court 
Narrows Home Office Deduction in Soliman, 78 1. Tax'n 132 
(1993). 
I13Id. at 137. 
114Id. 
II sId. The authors, a lawyer and a professor of taxation and 
accounting, respectively, evidence the worthlessness of Soliman 
by implying that it is better to avoid Soliman then to face it head 
on. 
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